Analysis: ‘Peace Deal in Name Only’ – Why Ukraine’s Agreements with US, Russia Could Set a Dangerous Precedent for International Law (2025)

When United States President Donald Trump wrote last week that he “hopes Russia and Ukraine will make a deal this week” on social media, his allies were already on the ground in Europe, working behind the scenes to broker what they call a ceasefire, and what critics see as a prelude to capitulation.

The posturing comes as the US and Ukraine announced the signing of a separate document – a memorandum of intent to deepen cooperation on critical minerals. Although it isn’t a formal treaty, it is a step beyond the political promises of late.

But even if such deals are signed, they could be meaningless under current international law, according to Maksym Vishchyk, a legal adviser at the international consultancy group Global Rights Compliance.

“Any agreement concluded or procured through the use of force or threat to use force is a void agreement,” he told Kyiv Post from the capital last week. “You cannot conclude the agreement while you are at gunpoint.”

That distinction matters now more than ever as the Trump team pushes a two-pronged diplomatic package: a so-called peace deal to halt the war, and the mineral memorandum, which Kyiv published in full last week.

While not legally binding, the memorandum formalizes a political commitment and has been portrayed as a strategic component in broader negotiations to end the war in Ukraine. The two agreements differ in important ways, but their underlying legality is the same.

“The agreement can only be valid after Ukraine can express a genuine free will and not be fearful of Russia’s retaliation or attack,” explained Vishchyk, calling into question the legal basis of the high-level international agreements currently being negotiated by Kyiv.

Legal lines already crossed

Both the mineral agreement and peace deal are moving forward as if Ukraine were free to accept or reject terms without pressure. But attacks have not stopped, and Russia still occupies roughly 20% of Ukrainian territory. That reality is central to why Vishchyk says the peace deal, and possibly also the mineral deal, cannot meet the legal threshold of legitimacy from the start.

“For as long as your territory continues to be occupied, you continue to be under attack,” he said. “From this perspective, any negotiations conducted while Russia continues to attack Ukraine will mean that Ukrainian will will be void and the agreement will be void too.”

International law, shaped after World War II to prevent precisely this kind of coercion, is explicit: peace treaties must reflect the free will of the victim state. Otherwise, they are not just flawed – they are void from their conception, with no legal effect from the moment they’re signed.

But here, the differences between the US-Ukraine mineral deal and the US-brokered Russia-Ukraine peace deal begin to show. While most legal experts agree that military occupation constitutes coercion, some debate whether intense political and economic pressure also meets the threshold for voiding an international treaty.

Were Trump’s attempts to publicly strongarm Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky into signing a bilateral agreement that was unfavorable to Kyiv a form of political coercion that, like military coercion, should nullify the treaty from the start?

“Legally, Ukraine is entitled not to sign it. But if Ukraine is pressured into a peace deal of that kind by, let’s say, Russia, the United States, or other countries, then what happens to the deal?” Vishchyk said. “The deal exists on paper… but it will be a non-existent thing for decades to come.”

That’s why any valid agreement must come only after Ukraine is no longer under any form of threat limiting its ability to choose freely, said Vishchyk, who is also an international law lecturer at the National University of Kyiv-Mohyla Academy.

“How we get out of it is only when Ukraine can express a genuine and free will, and for that, the attack has to stop.”

Territory off the table

If there’s one line Ukraine cannot cross in any future agreement, it’s the border. Despite claims that the Trump team may be open to legitimizing Russia’s control of Crimea as part of a broader peace framework, international law is clear: territorial concessions made under aggression are not only illegitimate, they are void.

“If the peace deal contains any provision on territorial concessions, then such provisions will be void, too,” Vishchyk said.

The legal bar is not just about fairness – it’s about preventing a return to conquest by force. States are bound under international law to reject the fruits of unjust wars of aggression – not just by avoiding formal recognition of illegally occupied land, but also by refusing to engage in policies, trade, or treaties that treat that territory as legally Russian.

Kyiv legally cannot be forced to sign a treaty when it does not have legal consent. “Even if Ukraine puts a signature on the paper, which is a peace deal in name only, then such... consent will not matter because it won’t be consent,” Vishchyk said.

The illegitimate treaty could lead to an endless cycle of war, as it has in the past. “Whether it’s 20 years from now, or 50 years from now, or 70 years from now... the Ukrainian government will have any legitimate right to... liberate Crimea,” Vishchyk said.

In international law, time does not legitimize illegal conquest.

A deal without Kyiv

Another growing concern in Kyiv is that a deal could be struck without Ukraine at the table – with the real negotiations taking place behind closed doors between Washington, Moscow, and a handful of international intermediaries. In this scenario, a political solution may likely be drafted abroad and delivered to Ukraine as a political reality that Ukraine is expected to accept.

But any such arrangement – no matter how diplomatically choreographed – would have no legal force under international law if Ukraine is not a consenting party to the talks.

“The law of treaties tells us clearly that any agreement reached about the state without the state present and consenting won’t create any legal obligations for such a state,” Vishchyk said.

That includes any bilateral or multilateral framework hammered out in Ukraine’s absence between Washington and Moscow, whether in secret or with quiet approval from European intermediaries. If Ukraine is not a party to the deal, the state cannot be bound by it – no matter how many others agree. “Even if formally Ukraine abides by it… If it is void, it is void,” Vishchyk said.

While Ukrainian officials acknowledged that discussions with the US and other partners have occurred in recent months, they emphasized that no authorization has been granted to the US to negotiate on Ukraine’s behalf – and that Kyiv has not agreed to any proposed terms. The idea that a peace framework could be imposed from abroad, whether through diplomatic pressure or conditional aid, calls into question what it means to exercise free will in an era of asymmetrical warfare.

The optics alone have raised concerns. One Ukrainian said that rumors of a deal being “90% done” were “misleading” and risked eroding Ukraine’s leverage at a critical moment. And the treaties face an entirely separate battle to get approved in Ukraine’s domestic legal system.

Vishchyk said the law makes space for negotiations, but not for coercion disguised as consensus. If Ukraine is sidelined, the result may look like a peace agreement. But legally, it will be something else entirely: a document without legal standing, and a dangerous precedent without legitimacy.

Murky legal waters

What happens next will not only shape Ukraine’s future but could also significantly influence the legal system of global conflict resolution and prevention that has governed the postwar era.

It now sits at the heart of a broader geopolitical test: Can a democratic nation under attack make decisions freely, without being pressured into concessions by the very powers that claim to support it? Or will its sovereignty be compromised behind closed doors?

Ukraine has become more than just a country at war, juggling fluid alliances. It is the testing site for whether the postwar system still works. The country’s fight for survival has made it both a victim of and a potential guidepost for the post-World War II legal and diplomatic world order, according to Vishchyk.

If the country continues to be supported in holding its ground, Kyiv could help reaffirm long-standing principles of sovereignty, non-aggression, and consent. But if it is sidelined or steered toward an agreement it did not freely choose, its agreements are void and can lead to more conflict and a degradation of the global system of law and order.

“Defiant Ukraine will essentially define the contours of future international law,” the legal scholar said.

Whatever deal emerges in the coming days, its legitimacy will depend not on who signs it – but on whether those signatures were given freely.